Abstract. It is a challenge for password authentication protocols using non-tamper resistant smart cards to achieve user anonymity, forward secrecy, immunity to various attacks and high performance at the same time. In DBSec'11, Li et al. showed that Kim and Chung's passwordbased remote user authentication scheme is vulnerable to various attacks if the smart card is non-tamper resistant. Consequently, an improved version was proposed and claimed that it is secure against smart card security breach attacks. In this paper, however, we will show that Li et al.'s scheme still cannot withstand offline password guessing attack under the non-tamper resistance assumption of the smart card. In addition, their scheme is also vulnerable to denial of service attack and fails to provide user anonymity and forward secrecy. As our main contribution, a robust scheme is presented to cope with the aforementioned defects, while keeping the merits of different password authentication schemes using smart cards. The analysis demonstrates that our scheme meets all the proposed criteria and eliminates several hard security threats that are difficult to be tackled at the same time in previous scholarship.
Introduction
Password-based authentication is widely used for systems that control remote access to computer networks. In order to address some of the security and management problems that occur in traditional password authentication protocols, research in recent decades has focused on smart card based password authentication. Since Chang and Wu [1] introduced the first remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in 1993, there have been many smart card based authentication schemes proposed [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . In most of the previous authentication schemes, the smart card is assumed to be tamper-resistant, i.e., the secret information stored in the smart card cannot be revealed. However, recent research results have shown that the secret data stored in the smart card could be extracted by some means, such as monitoring the power consumption [8, 9] or analyzing the leaked information [10] . Therefore, such schemes based on the tamper resistance assumption of the smart card are vulnerable to some types of attacks, such as user impersonation attacks, server masquerading attacks, and offline password guessing attacks, etc., once an adversary has obtained the secret information stored in a user's smart card and/or just some intermediate computational results in the smart card.
Another common feature of the published schemes is that the user's identity is transmitted in plaintext over insecure networks during the authentication process, which may leak the identity of the logging user once the login messages were eavesdropped, hence user privacy is not preserved. The leakage of the user identity may also cause an unauthorized entity to track the user's login history and current location [5, 7] . In many cases, it is of utmost importance to provide anonymity so that the adversary cannot trace user activity. Therefore, user anonymity is an important feature that a practical authentication scheme should achieve.
As noted by Blake-Wilson et al. [11] , forward secrecy is an admired security feature for authentication protocols with session keys establishment. Particularly, forward secrecy is a property concerned with limiting the effects of eventual failure of the entire system. It indicates that, even if the long-term private keys of one or more entities are compromised, the secrecy of previous session keys established by honest entities should not be affected and thus the previous sessions shall remain secure [12] . Hence, a sound authentication scheme should achieve this important property.
As mentioned in Refs. [3, 7, 13, 14] and the above description, the following criteria are important for smart card based remote user authentication schemes in terms of friendliness, security and efficiency: (C1) the server needs not to maintain a security-sensitive verification table; (C2) the password is memorable, and can be chosen freely by the user; (C3) the password cannot be derived by the privileged administrator of the server; (C4) the security of the scheme is not based on the tamper resistance assumption of the smart card; (C5) the scheme can resist various kinds of sophisticated attacks, such as offline password guessing attack, replay attack, parallel session attack, denial of service attack, stolen verifier attack, user/server impersonation attack; (C6) the password cannot be broken by guessing attack even if the smart card is lost/stolen and compromised; (C7) the client and the server can establish a common session key during the authentication process; (C8) the scheme is not prone to the problems of clock synchronization and time-delay; (C9) the user can change the password locally without any interaction with the authentication server; (C10) the scheme can achieve mutual authentication; (C11) the scheme preserves user anonymity to avoid partial information leakage; (C12) the scheme provides the property of forward secrecy.
In 2009, Kim and Chung [15] showed that Yoon and Yoo's scheme [16] easily reveals a user's password and is prone to stolen verifier attack, user impersonation attack and server masquerading attack, and then they proposed an improved scheme. Later on, Kim et al. [17] showed that Kim and Chung's scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack, unlimited online password guessing attack and server masquerading attack if the smart card is non-tamper resistant. In DBSec'11, Li et al. [18] also identified that Kim and Chung's scheme cannot withstand various attacks stated above and further proposed an enhanced remote authentication scheme. They claimed their scheme is secure and can overcome all the identified security flaws of Kim and Chung's scheme even if the smart card is non-tamper resistant. In this work, however, we will demonstrate that Li et al.'s scheme cannot withstand denial of service attack, and it is still vulnerable to offline password guessing attack under their assumption. In addition, their scheme does not provide the feature of forward secrecy and user anonymity. To conquer the identified weaknesses, a robust authentication scheme based on the secure one-way hash function and the well-known discrete logarithm problem is presented.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review Li et al.'s authentication scheme. Section 3 describes the weaknesses of Li et al.'s scheme. Our proposed scheme is presented in Section 4, and its security analysis is given in Section 5. The comparison of the performance of our scheme with the other related schemes is shown in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Review of Li et al.'s scheme
In this section, we briefly illustrate the remote user authentication scheme proposed by Li et al. [18] in DBSec 2011. Their scheme consists of four phases: registration, login, verification and password update. For ease of presentation, we employ some intuitive abbreviations and notations listed in Table 1 . 
collision free one-way hash function ⊕ the bitwise XOR operation ∥ the string concatenation operation A → B : C message C is transferred through a common channel from A to B A ⇒ B : C message C is transferred through a secure channel from A to B
Registration phase
The registration phase involves the following operations: 1) User U i chooses his/her identity ID i , password P i , and then generates a random number RN 1 .
2)
3) On receiving the registration message from U i , the server S creates an entry {ID i , N, h(h(P i ⊕ RN 1 ))} in the verification table,where N = 0 if it is U i 's initial registration, otherwise S set N = N + 1. Then, server S computes
Upon receiving the smart card,user U i stores RN 1 into his/her smart card.
Login phase
When U i wants to login to S, the following operations will be performed: 1) U i inserts his/her smart card into the card reader, and inputs ID i ,P i and a random number RN 2 .
2) The smart card generates a random number RC and then computes
Verification phase
After receiving the login request from user U i , S performs the following operations:
1) The server S checks the validity of identity ID i by checking whether ID i is already stored in its verification table. If not, the request is rejected. Otherwise, the S computes 
, and obtains (C 5 ,RC) by decrypting C 6 . Then, S replaces the third field h(h(P i ⊕RN i )) of the entry corresponding to ID i with C 5 = h((P i ⊕RN 2 )), generates a random RS and computes
3) On receiving the response from server S, the smart card computes the sym-
) by decrypting the received message using K s . Then, the smart card checks whether (RC ′ , C ′ 5 ) equals to (RC, C 5 ) generated in the login phase. This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of the server S and replaces original RN 1 and C 1 with new RN 2 and
the serve S compares the computed h(RS) with the received value of h(RS)
′ . If they are not equal, the connection is terminated. 6) The user U i and the server S agree on the session key SK = h(RC ⊕ RS) for securing future data communications.
Password change phase
The password change phase is provided to allow users to change their passwords freely. Since the password change phase has little to do with our discussion, we omit it here and detailed information is referred to Ref. [18] .
Cryptanalysis of Li et al.'s scheme
In this section we will show that Li et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and denial of service attack. In addition, their scheme fails to preserve user anonymity and forward secrecy. Although tamper resistant smart card is widely assumed in most of the published authentication schemes, such an assumption is difficult in practice. Many researchers have shown that the secret information stored in a smartcard can be breached by analyzing the leaked information or by monitoring the power consumption [8] [9] [10] . Be aware of this threat, Li et al. intentionally based their scheme on the assumption of non-tamper resistance of the smart card. However, Li et al.'s scheme fails to serve its purposes.
Offline password guessing attack
In Li et al.'s scheme, a user is allowed to choose his/her own password at will during the registration and password change phases. The user usually tends to select a password, i.e., his phone number, which is easily remembered for his/her convenience. Hence, these easy-to-remember passwords, called weak passwords [19] , have low entropy and thus are potentially vulnerable to password guessing attack. Therefore, one of the most important security requirements for sound password-based authentication protocols is to resist against this threat. Li et al. showed that Kim and Chung's scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack once the adversary has obtained the secret information stored in the stolen smart card. However, we will show that Li et al.'s scheme still suffers from this threat as follows.
Let us consider the following scenarios. In case a legitimate user U , i s smart card is stolen by an adversary A just before U ′ i s jth login, and the stored secret values such as C 1 and RN j can be revealed. Then, A returns the smart card to U i and eavesdrops on the insecure channel. Because U i 's identity is transmitted in plaintext within the login request, it is not difficult for A to identify the login request message from U i . Once the jth login request message
} is intercepted by A, an offline password guessing attack can be launched in the following steps:
Step 1. Guesses the value of P i to be P * i from a uniformly distributed dictionary.
Step 2.
, as C 1 has been extracted and C j 4 has been intercepted, where
Step 4. Verifies the correctness of P * i by checking if T is equal to T ′ .
Step 5. Repeats Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this phase until the correct value of P i is found.
After guessing the correct value of P i , the adversary Acan compute C
. Then the adversary can obtain RC j by decrypting C j 6 using K j Ui , and gets RS j in a similar way. Hence the malicious user can successfully compute the session key SK j = h(RC j ⊕RS j ) and renders the jth session between U i and S completely insecure.
Moreover, once the jth login request message is intercepted, A may block the communication channel between U i and S completely until the session key SK j = h(RC j ⊕ RS j ) was obtained as stated above. Thereafter, A can fabricate and send a valid login request to the server S and masquerade as a legitimate user U i , or A can fabricate and send a valid password change request to update the entry corresponding to U i in the verification table on S. In either case, from then on U i will not be able to login to the server S. This leads to a strong denial of service attack.
Denial of service attack
A denial of service attack is an offensive action whereby the adversary could use some methods to work upon the server so that the login requests issued by the legitimate user will be denied by the server. In Li et at.' scheme, an adversary can easily launch a denial of service attack in the following steps:
Step 1. Eavesdrops over the channel, intercepts a login request {ID i , C j 4 , C j 6 } from U i and blocks it, supposing it is U i 's jth login.
Step 2. Replaces C After receiving this modified message, S will perform Step V 1 and V 2 of the verification phase without observing any abnormality, as a result, the verifier corresponding to ID i in the verification table will be updated and the response
thus the session will be terminated. Thereafter, U i 's succeeding login requests will be denied unless he/she re-registers to S again. That is, the adversary can easily lock the account of any legitimate user without using any cryptographic techniques. Thus, Li et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to denial of service attack.
Failure to achieve forward secrecy
Let us consider the following scenarios. Supposing the server S's long time private key x is leaked out by accident or intentionally stolen by an adversary A. Once the value of x is obtained, with previously intercepted C j 4 , C j 6 and E K S (RC, RS, C 5 ) transmitted in the legitimate user U i 's jth authentication process, A can compute the session key of S and U i 's jth encrypted communication through the following method:
Step 1. Assumes N = 0.
, where ID i is previously obtained by eavesdropping on the insecure channel.
Step 3.
Step 4. Decrypts C j 6 with K * Ui to obtain RC * i .
Step 5. Decrypts E KS (RC, RS, C 5 ) with K * S to obtain RC * * i .
Step 6. Verifies the correctness of N by checking if RC * i is equal to RC * * i . If they are unequal, sets N = N + 1 and goes back to Setp2.
Step 7. Decrypts E KS (RC, RS, C 5 ) to obtain RS i using K * S .
Step 8.
Note that the value of N should not be very big, since the re-registration phase is not performed frequently in practice, and thus the above procedure can be completed in polynomial time. Therefore, Li et al.'s scheme fails to provide forward secrecy.
Failure to preserve user anonymity
In many e-commerce applications, the violation of user anonymity may leak some personal secret information (e.g., secret online-order placement, transaction records, etc.) about the logging user to the adversary, and thus the provision of user anonymity is very important. What's more, the leakage of the user identity may cause an unauthorized entity to track the user's login history and current location [5] . Therefore, assuring anonymity does not only preserve user privacy but also make remote user authentication protocols more secure.
In Li et al.'s scheme, user's identity ID is static and in plaintext form in all the transaction sessions, an adversary can easily obtain the plaintext identity of this communicating client once the login messages were eavesdropped, and hence, different login request messages belonging to the same user can be traced out and may be interlinked to derive some secret information related to the user. Hence, user anonymity is not preserved.
Our proposed scheme
According to our analysis, three principles for designing a sound password-based remote user authentication scheme are presented. First, user anonymity, especially in some application scenarios, (e.g., e-commence), should be preserved, because from the identity ID i , some personal secret information may be leaked about the user. Second, a nonce based mechanism is often a better choice than the timestamp based design to resist replay attacks, since clock synchronization is difficult and expensive in existing network environment, especially in wide area networks, and these schemes employing timestamp may still suffer from replay attacks as the transmission delay is unpredictable in real networks [20] . Finally, the password change process should be performed locally without the hassle of interaction with the remote authentication server for the sake of security, user friendliness and efficiency [3] . In this section, we present a new remote user authentication scheme to satisfy all the twelve criteria listed in section 1.
Registration phase
Let (x, y = g x mod n) denote the server S's private key and its corresponding public key, where x is kept secret by the server and y is stored inside each user's smart card. The registration phase involves the following operations:
Step R1. U i chooses his/her identity ID i , password P i and a random number b.
Step R2.
Step R3. On receiving the registration message from U i , the server S computes
Step R5. Upon receiving the smart card, U i enters b into his smart card.
Login phase
When U i wants to login the system, the following operations will be performed:
Step L1. U i inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs ID * i , P * i .
Step Step L3. The smart card chose a random number u and computes
Verification phase
After receiving the login request, the server S performs the following operations: 0 In the abridged version [22] , there is a mistake (or typo) in the formation of Mi as h(CIDi ∥ C1 ∥ h(x ∥ IDi)), and we correct it here. June 3, 2012.
Step V1. The server S computes Y 2 = (C 1 ) x mod n using its private key x, and
with the received value of M i . If they are not equal, the request is rejected. Otherwise, server S generates a random number v and computes the session key SK = (
Step V3. On receiving the reply message from the server S,
, and compares C * 3 with the received C 3 . This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of the server S, and U i goes on to compute
and then checks if C * 4 is equal to the received value of C 4 . If this verification holds, the server S authenticates the user U i and the login request is accepted else the connection is terminated.
Step V6. The user U i and the server S agree on the common session key SK for securing future data communications.
Password change phase
In this phase, we argue that the user's smart card must have the ability to detect the failure times. Once the number of login failure exceeds a predefined system value, the smart card must be locked immediately to prevent the exhaustive password guessing behavior. This phase involves the following steps.
Step P1. U i inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs the identity ID i and the original password P i .
Step P2. The smart card computes 
Security analysis
Although it is important to provide a formal security proof on any cryptographic protocols, the formal security proof of user authentication protocols with smart cards remains one of the most challenging issues for cryptography research [21] . Until now, a simple, efficient and convincing formal methodology for correctness analysis of security protocols is still an important subject of research and an open problem. Few schemes [6, 13] do provide formal security proof, unfortunately they are shortly found contradictory to their security claims because the formal methods employed all fail to capture some realistic attack scenarios [14] . Due to these reasons, most published user authentication schemes using smart cards [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 7, [15] [16] [17] [18] have been demonstrated with a simple proof. Therefore, we follow the approaches used in [5, 7] for comparison purpose. This opens a prominent future scope of this work to develop a simple and robust formal method for security analysis of user authentication protocols with smart cards. The security of our proposed authentication scheme is based on the secure hash function and the discrete logarithm problem. In the following, we will analyze the security of the proposed scheme to verify whether the security requirements mentioned in Section 1 have been satisfied under the assumption that the secret information stored in the smart card can be revealed, i.e., the security parameters N i , A i and y can be obtained by a malicious privileged user.
(1) User anonymity: Suppose that the attacker has intercepted U i 's authentication messages
Then, the adversary may try to retrieve any static parameter from these messages, but these messages are all session-variant and indeed random strings due to the randomness of u and/or v. Accordingly, without knowing the random number u, the adversary will face to solve the discrete logarithm problem to retrieve the correct value of ID i from CID i ,, while ID i is the only static element corresponding to U i in the transmitted messages. Hence, the proposed scheme can preserve user anonymity. (2) Offline password guessing attack: Suppose that a malicious privileged user U i has got U k 's smart card, and the secret information b, N k , A k and y can also be revealed under our assumption of the non-tamper resistant smart card. Even after gathering this information, the attacker has to at least guess both ID i and P i correctly at the same time, because it has been demonstrated that our scheme can provide identity protection. It is impossible to guess these two parameters correctly at the same time in polynomial time, and thus the proposed scheme can resist offline password guessing attack with smart card security breach. (3) Stolen verifier attack and password disclosure to server: In the proposed protocol, no sensitive verifiers corresponding to users are maintained by S. Therefore, the proposed protocol is free from stolen verifier attack. With h(b ∥ P i ) instead of plaintext password P i submitted to server S, it is computationally infeasible to derive P i from h(b ∥ P i ) without knowing the random number b due to the one-way property of the secure hash function. On the other hand, the presented scheme resists parallel session attack, in which an adversary may masquerade as legitimate user U i by replaying a previously intercepted authentication message. The attacker cannot compute valid C 3 because he does not know the values of h(x ∥ ID i ) corresponding to user U i . Therefore, the resistance to replay attack and parallel session attack can be guaranteed in our protocol. (7) Mutual authentication: In our dynamic ID-based scheme, the server authenticates the user by checking the validity of C 4 in the access request.
We have shown that our scheme can preserve user anonymity, so user ID i is only known to the server S and the user U i itself. We have proved that our scheme can resist user impersonation attack. Therefore, it is impossible for an adversary to forge messages to masquerade as U i in our scheme. To pass the authentication of server S, the smart card first needs U i 's identity ID i and password P i to get through the verification in Step L2 of the login phase. In this Section, we have shown that our scheme can resist offline password guessing attack. Therefore, only the legal user U i who owns correct ID i and P i can pass the authentication of server S. On the other hand, the user U i authenticates server S by explicitly checking whether the other party communicating with can compute the valid C 3 or not. Since the malicious server does not know the values of ID i corresponding to user U i and x corresponding to server S, only the legitimate server can compute the correct
From the above analysis, we conclude that our scheme can achieve mutual authentication. (8) Denial of service attack:Assume that an adversary has got a legitimate user U i 's smart card. However, in our scheme, the smart card computes
) and compares it with the stored value of A i in its memory to checks the validity of user identity ID i and password P i before the password update procedure. It is not possible for the adversary to guess out U i 's identity ID i and password P i correctly at the same time in polynomial time. Moreover, once the number of login failure exceeds a predefined system value, the smart card will be locked immediately. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against denial of service attack. (9) Forward secrecy:Following our scheme, the client and the server can establish the same session key SK = (C 1 ) v = (C 2 ) u = g uv mod n . Based on the difficulty of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, any previously generated session keys cannot be revealed without knowledge of the ephemeral u and v. As a result, our scheme provides the property of forward secrecy.
Performance analysis
To evaluate our scheme, we compare the performance and the satisfaction of the criteria among relevant authentication schemes and our proposed scheme in this section. The reason why the schemes presented in [4, 5, 23] , instead of other works mentioned earlier in this paper, are selected to compare with is that, these three schemes are the few ones that can withstand offline password guessing attack under the non-tamper resistance assumption of the smart cards. The criteria of a secure and practical remote user authentication scheme are introduced in Section 1, and the comparison results are depicted in Table 2 and 3, respectively.
Since the login phase and verification phase are executed much more frequently than the other two phases, only the computation cost, communication overhead and storage cost during the login phase and verification phase are taken into consideration. Without loss of generality, the identity ID i , password P i , random numbers, timestamp values and output of secure one-way hash function are all recommended to be 128-bit long, while n, y and g are all 1024-bit long. Let T H , T E , T I , T S and T X denote the time complexity for hash function, exponential operation, inverse operation, symmetric cryptographic operation and XOR operation respectively. Since the time complexity of XOR operation is negligible as compared to the other three operations, we do not take T X into account. Typically, time complexity associated with these operations can be roughly expressed as [24] [25] [26] .
In our scheme, the parameters {N i , A i , y i , n, g}are stored in the smart card, thus the storage cost is 3328 * (= 2 * 128+3 * 1024)bits. The communication overhead includes the capacity of transmitting message involved in the authentication scheme, which is 2560(= * 4 * 128 + 2 * 1024) bits. During the login and verification phase, the total computation cost of the user and server is 6T E + 12T H . As illustrated in Table 2 , the proposed scheme is more efficient than Horng et al.'s scheme, enjoys nearly the same performance with Chen et al.'s scheme and Chung et al.'s scheme. 1 A denial of service attack on the server is identified in their scheme as any malicious legitimate user can fabricate valid login requests but this malicious action can be only detected in the final exchange. 2 A reflection attack is identified in their scheme as any adversary can impersonate server S to send {M = T, U = V } to Ui on receiving the login request message {ID, V, T, N } at any given session. As compared to Li et al.'s scheme, to withstand offline password guessing attack, public-key techniques are employed, which has been proved unavoidable by Halevi and Krawczyk in [27] , and thus at least two exponentiations are required; to provide the feature of forward secrecy, the generation of the session key based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm is common practice, and hence it needs another four exponentiations; to achieve user anonymity and other functionalities simultaneously, some additional costs are necessary. As a word, to conquer all the identified security flaws, the decrease of some performance is unavoidable and reasonable. Table 3 gives a comparison of the admired features of our proposed scheme with the other relevant authentication schemes. Our proposed scheme provides forward secrecy (C12) and can change password locally (C6), while the schemes presented by Li et al. and Chen et al. fail to achieve these features; Our proposed scheme preserves user anonymity (C11), while the schemes presented by Li et al., Chung et al. and Chen et al. do not provide this property; our proposed scheme can resist various kinds of known attacks (C5), while the other four latest schemes suffer from several security vulnerabilities. It is clear that our scheme meets more criteria as compared to other relevant authentication schemes using non-tamper resistant smart cards.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated several attacks on Li et al.'s scheme. As to our main contribution, a robust authentication scheme is proposed to remedy these identified flaws, the security and performance analysis demonstrate that our presented scheme achieves all of the twelve independent requirements with high efficiency and thus our scheme is more secure and efficient for practical use. Remarkably, our scheme eliminates several hard security threats that are difficult to be solved at the same time in previous scholarship. In future work, we will develop a practical formal method for security analysis of authentication protocols using smart cards.
